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BEYOND MISCLASSIFICATION:  
THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF WORK 
 
Miriam A. Cherry* 
  
As the Internet and computer technology have become increasingly 
ubiquitous, new ways to buy and sell not only objects, but also time, 
effort,  and labor have been developed.  In an earlier article I termed this 
trend “virtual work,”1 and it has been alternately described as “labor as a 
service,” “peer production,”  “playbor,”  or “crowdwork.”2  Some 
processes of “crowdwork”  or “micro-labor”  involve computer-based work 
that is performed wholly in cyberspace, where work is broken down into 
its smallest constituent parts (such as coding, describing, or tagging the 
thousands of items for sale on a website).3  Other types of crowdwork are 
aided by cellphone applications (“apps”) or websites, and they rely on 
technology to deploy workers to perform tasks (such as driving, grocery 
delivery, or home repair services) for requesters in the real world who pay 
for these services, with the app or platform keeping a percentage of the 
exchange.   
According to a recent survey conducted by Time Magazine,  over 
14 million people currently work in the “gig,” “on demand” or “sharing” 
economy.4  While these statistics have been the subject of controversy,5 
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1 Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work,  45 GA.  L.  REV.  951 (2011) (using term “virtual work” 
broadly not only to encompass virtual worlds but also to refer to work taking place online, including the type of 
micro-labor crowdwork performed on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk).  
2 See Trebor Scholz & Laura Liu, From Mobile Playgrounds to Sweatshop City,  SITUATED 
TECHNOLOGIES PAMPHLETS  7 (2010), http://www.situatedtechnologies.net/?q= node/105.  
3 See, e.g.  Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 176, 178-79 (using term 
“crowdsourcing” to describe work performed with the aid of contributions from diverse groups of users on the 
internet); Deborah Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses, A Manifesto for User-Generated 
Rights,  11 VAND.  J.  ENT.  & TECH.  L. 921, 929 (2009) (“Computer technology in the hands of the masses has 
made available software programs that can create music, documents, and art just as well as expensive studios 
did in the past. This democratization of technology disrupts the monopoly on the creative means of production. 
The world of amateur production also demonstrates that many are motivated by noncommercial reasons.”). 
4 Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is,  TIME,  Jan.6, 2016 available at 
http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/ 
5 Cole Stangler, December Jobs Report: How Many Gig Economy Workers are There, Really?,  INT’L BUS.  
TIMES,  Jan. 8, 2016, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/december-jobs-report-how-many-gig-economy-
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there can be no doubt that technology is re-shaping the future of work.  
Examples include websites and apps that range from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk,6 Handy,7 Instacart,8 to Uber.9  These new companies’ labor 
practices have sparked intense litigation in the United States.  Currently, 
the litigation is focusing on a common doctrinal issue – whether the 
workers in the platform, on-demand economy have the status of 
employees or independent contractors.  The question of employee status is 
particularly important because many of the rights and benefits provided 
for in U.S. employment law (minimum wage, protection from 
discrimination,  unemployment insurance, worker’s compensation) are only 
triggered for those who are deemed to be “employees.”10             
The first part of this article provides a brief litigation update on the 
various worker lawsuits within the on-demand economy.  While O’Connor 
v. Uber11 has received the lion’s share of attention and analysis,12 similar 
lawsuits on labor standards have been filed against other on-demand 
economy platforms.  Analysis of the ongoing litigation reveals several 
important themes, including an emphasis on the labor law of California.   
The second part of the article shifts from the doctrinal issues around 
misclassification to look at the larger picture.  Based on the work of 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone,13 the second part argues that we are currently 
experiencing a far-reaching digital transformation of work.   The changes 
include the growth of automatic management and a move toward ever 
more precarious work.  To the extent that technology can help us realize 
Stone’s vision of knowledge work with increased training and the 
“boundary-less career,” that is positive.  It is questionable, however, if 
                                                                                                       
workers-are-there-really-2255765.  In the article, prominent economists Alan Kreuger and Larry Mishel both 
quibble with the numbers in the Time survey, supra note [ ], arguing that the numbers of on-demand economy 
workers are far lower.  What is interesting is that both economists have ideological reasons for minimizing the 
number of workers.  If the number of workers in the on-demand economy is small, that supports the argument 
that there is no need for regulation, a notion that Kreuger, who once consulted for Uber, could get behind.  The 
reason for Mishel’s minimization of the on demand economy is cloudy, but it may have to do with the idea that 
labor unions should continue to appeal to their traditional base and ignore technological change.  Lawrence 
Mishel, Uber is Not the Future of Work,  THE ATLANTIC,  Nov. 16, 2015.  Such a stance seems extremely short-
sighted. In any event,  the idea that technology is not important to work is belied by many examples, from Ned 
Ludd’s displacement by the power loom to John Henry’s defeat by the steam engine.  
6https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome 
7http://www.handy.com/  
8https://www.instacart.com/  
9www.uber.com  
10 See infra Part I.  
11 O’Connor v. Uber, 3:13-cv-03826-EMC (N.D. Cal.).  
12For just a small sampling of press coverage, see, e.g.  James Surowiecki, Gigs with Benefits,  NEW 
YORKER,  July 6,  2015, available at http://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2015/07/06/gigs-with-benefits; Mark R. Warner, Asking Tough Questions About the Gig Economy, 
WASH.  POST,  June 18, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/asking-tough-questions-about-the-gig-
economy/2015/06/18/b43f2d0a-1461-11e5-9ddc-e3353542100c_story.html.  
13 KATHERINE V.W.  STONE,  FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS (2004).  
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crowdwork truly extends the framework for digital work.  In some 
aspects, the new crowdwork seems a throwback to the de-skilled industrial 
processes associated with Taylor, but without the loyalty and job security. 
 
I.  Litigation in the On Demand Economy 
 
This section provides an update of current on-demand worker 
litigation in the United States.14  Of necessity this article provides a 
temporal snapshot, as these cases are rapidly developing.  As of this 
writing many of the important legal issues are uncertain, as they were 
settled out of court or are currently set for trial.  Why the wait from the 
time when these companies began operating and when these litigations 
were filed?  I would posit that the lag is due to the fact that fundamental 
questions about labor standards have been obscured by the rhetoric of the 
“sharing economy” or “cooperative economics.”    
Ridesharing company Lyft originally positioned itself within the 
Bay Area as a type of collective service where neighbors with cars helped 
those who were without.  The result was supposed to build on community 
spirit and to encourage environmentally-conscious behavior such as 
ridesharing or carpooling.  This putative “sharing economy” tapped into the 
long and venerable history of collective community sharing initiatives.
15
  In 
the past, resources were often shared amongst a community based on ties of 
kinship, friendship, or religious affiliation.  Communities also set up 
exchange systems based on “barter” or timeshares, where individuals were 
able to bank and trade the time and skills, and groups shared tools or 
machinery.
16
  Indeed, we need look no further than the institution of the 
lending library to see instances where collective resources keep citizens 
well-informed and educated.
17
    These collective efforts depended on a 
mixture of trade, volunteerism, and altruism.
18
    
For some time these roots in cooperative sharing structures obscured 
the commercial component of the on-demand economy.  In my 2013 article, 
Cyber Commodification, I analyzed the ways in which segments of 
cyberspace were becoming either free and open access or, on the other 
hand, becoming commodified spaces.
19
  The lines between the monetized 
                                         
14 The importance of keeping track of these cases and analyzing their outcomes is detailed in Claire 
Zillman, California’s Uber Driver Decision Could Throw a Wrench into the Sharing Economy,  FORTUNE,  June 
17, 2015, available at http://fortune.com/2015/06/17/uber-drivers-are-employees-sharing-economy/. 
15 Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Economy,  27 J.  ENVIRONMENTAL L.  
& LITIG. ,  1, 4 (2012). 
16 Id.  See generally JANELL ORSI,  PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY (2012).  
17 Id.  
18 On altruism, see LYNN STOUT,  CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 
(2010).  
19 See generally Miriam A. Cherry, Cyber Commodification,  72 MD.  L.  REV.  381 (2013).  
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and the free seemed in some instances to blur, causing confusion and 
sparking contests and disputes.
20
  In some instances, businesses struggled to 
monetize the value that was being created through new efficiencies, 
connections between people, and use of underutilized resources.
21
  With the 
rise of the on-demand apps, it seems that business owners have, (at least in 
part), figured out how to harness some of the value and efficiencies created 
by these technologies.
22
 
In terms of the litigation update, the ridesharing/taxi services Uber 
and Lyft have probably garnered the most attention over their labor 
practices, so we will begin with them.23  Uber alone has approximately 
400,000 drivers in the United States,24 and ridesharing services have 
become especially popular with customers in densely populated east and 
west coast cities.  Rather than hailing or flagging down a cab in a crowded 
street, or calling a phone number to order a cab, the customer summons a 
taxi by using an application (“app”) on their cellphone, which is GPS-
enabled.  The app matches available drivers, who are using their 
privately-owned vehicles, with passengers nearby who need rides. 
Customers often prefer this type of model as opposed to hailing or calling 
a cab because the app is faster and more convenient, and has the benefit of 
allowing the passenger to track where the driver is and thus to have a 
better sense of scheduling the trip.  
Originally, some of the litigation and opposition to these 
ridesharing services came either from existing taxicab owners and from 
local governments.  Largely unregulated and unlicensed, (and  in many 
instances even perhaps uninsured), questions existed about safety 
concerns.  Uber has largely brushed those concerns aside, adopting an 
aggressive litigation stance. 25  For example, the Metropolitan Taxi 
Commission in St. Louis originally refused to let Uber operate in the city 
limits because of a lack of background checks for drivers.   Uber then sued 
                                         
20 Id.  at 426-439.  
21 Id.  at 435-439 (noting difficulty of businesses in monetizing WiFi service).  
22 See also Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative Capitalist 
System,  90 TUL.  L.  REV.  241 (2015) (arguing that current forms of regulation do not fit well with the sharing 
economy because of a lack of fit with traditional business models).  The qualifier of “at least in part” is due to 
the fact that some Internet companies, such as Facebook, still have not figured out optimal monetization.  
23 Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy,  49 U.C.  DAVIS L.  REV.  __ (2016) 
(examining doctrinal tests for employee and independent contractor status in the Uber litigation).  
24 This was the approximate size of the class certified in O’Connor v. Uber. 
25 Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 102 (2015) (“Which brings us 
back to the public's mistrust of Uber. The company's name clearly evinces Nietzsche's vision of a new morality 
and a new class dedicated to human excellence. But in Uber executives' hands, that ideal has become little more 
than a defense of privilege. The company's leaders seem just fine with a future in which the many are supplicant 
to the few, and the few are licensed to disregard ordinary rules. Uber's slogan--“Everyone's private driver”--speaks 
volumes. Perhaps the public's intuitive skepticism toward Uber reflects a widespread sense that our economy 
should reflect basic democratic values.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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the Taxi Commission in federal court, alleging antitrust violations for their 
exclusion.26  The St. Louis Taxi Commission has in return also brought a 
lawsuit seeking to enjoin Uber’s operations, and Uber is being sued by 
individual taxi drivers as well.27             
In the litigation in the Northern District of California, Uber drivers 
filed suit, seeking minimum wage protections and overtime pay under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).28  The availability of the FSLA, 
however, depends first and foremost upon a finding that a worker,  or class 
of workers, are “employees.”29  Under U.S. law, whether a worker is an 
employee or independent contractor is determined through various 
multifactored tests dependent on the facts of the relationship.30  The 
“control”  test derives from the caselaw and decisions on agency law, and 
focuses on a principal’s right to control the worker.  Other papers in this 
colloquium will address these issues more in-depth,31 but suffice it to say 
that some of the factors for finding employee status are whether the 
employer may direct the way in which the work is performed, determine 
the hours involved, and provide the employee with direction. 32  On the 
other hand, elements that lean toward independent contractor classification 
include high-skilled work, workers providing their own equipment, 
workers setting their own schedules, and getting paid per project, not per 
hour.33  In an alternate test, courts examine the economic realities of the 
relationship to determine whether the worker is exhibiting entrepreneurial 
activity, or whether the worker is financially dependent upon the 
                                         
26 For a short summary of the long and tortured story of Uber in Saint Louis, Missouri,  see Leah Thorsen,  
St. Louis Area Taxi Drivers File Suit Against Uber, ST.  LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,  Nov. 16, 2015,  available at 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/st-louis-area-taxi-drivers-file-suit-against-uber/article_f2c2a69f-
90cb-58a6-b513-d122cb6189cd.html.   The various cases that are pending in court include St. Louis 
Metropolitan Taxicab Commission v. Uber, Inc. et al., 4:15-cv-01562-HEA (E.D. Mo. 2015); Wallen et al v. St. 
Louis Metropolitan Taxicab Commission et al.,  4:15-cv-01432-HEA (E.D. Mo. 2015); Vilcek, et al. v. Uber 
USA, LLC, et al., 4:15-CV-1900  (E.D. Mo. 2015).   
27 Id.  
28 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 
29 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 
30 See Katharine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers 
without Workplaces and and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 257-58 (2006) 
(listing factors from the cases).  Oft-cited cases on this subject include Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 
U.S. 722, 728-29 (1947); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. U.S., 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968); Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992).  
31 [Insert cross references to other papers in the volume].  
32 See, e.g.  Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Service, Inc., 161 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1998).  
33 See, e.g. Richard R. Carlson, Variations on A Theme of Employment: Labor Law Regulation of Alternative 
Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1996) (“Most labor and employment laws assume a paradigmatic 
relationship between an “employer” and “employee.” The employer in this model contracts directly with an 
individual employee to perform an indefinite series or duration of tasks, subject to the employer's actual or 
potential supervision over the employee's method, manner, time and place of performance. This model describes 
most workers well enough, but there has always been a large pool of workers in alternative relationships with 
recipients of services. Some workers are “independent contractors” who contract to perform specific tasks or 
achieve particular results, but who retain independence and self-management over their performance.”). 
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employer.34  The label affixed to the relationship is a factor in the 
outcome, but it is certainly not dispositive.  In any event, the tests are 
notoriously malleable, even when dealing with what should be a fairly 
straightforward analysis.35 
Thus Uber’s situation has been seen as legally problematic, and the 
federal judges of the Northern District of California have struggled to 
characterize it within the “on/off” toggle of employee status.36  As some 
have noted, with Uber some of the factors in the control test point toward 
an employee relationship while others are reminiscent of an independent 
contractor relationship.37  On the one hand, crowdworkers have some 
flexibility to set their own schedules and can sign on and off the app more 
readily than do real workers in a traditional environment who work a set 
shift or who are otherwise tethered to a workplace desk or factory floor.  
Crowdworkers also use their own cellular telephones, computer 
equipment, Internet connections, and other instrumentalities.  Further, 
EULAs contractually label crowdworkers as “independent contractors.”   
On the other hand, many factors lean toward an employment 
relationship.  Control may be high, given that companies like Uber use 
customer ratings to maintain almost a constant surveillance over workers, 
with consumers deputized to manage the workforce.  Many on-demand 
companies spend a great deal of time and effort to implement quality 
control policies.  With low skilled crowdwork, the opportunity for 
entrepreneurship, and with it risk-and-reward, is barely, if at all,  present.    
The terminology in a EULA is far from dispositive, as such online 
contracts are known to be extremely one-sided and are construed against 
the drafter.  The possibility for exploitation is high, and low-skilled 
workers are those that are most in need of FLSA protection.    
All of this has left the judges in the Northern District of California 
                                         
34 Stone, supra note [ ] at 257-58.  
35 Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to 
Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 298 (2001) (“Indeed, in the case of employee status, the law 
encourages ambiguity. On the one hand, employers often crave the control they enjoy in a normal employment 
relationship. On the other, the advantages (to employers) of employing workers who are plausibly not employees 
motivate a good deal of arbitrary and questionable “non-employee” classification. It is not uncommon to find 
employees and putative contractors sitting side by side, performing the same work without any immediately 
visible distinguishing characteristics.13 And the trend of the working world is toward greater complexity and 
variation, driven partly by the temptation to capitalize on the fog that obscures the essence of many working 
relationships.”) 
36 Again, this has been a longstanding problem.  See, e.g.  Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of 
Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 101 (1998) (“The new ways of working, that I believe challenge 
normal legal analyses, include such new relations of employment as temporary employment placed by an agency 
and part-time employment rendered by people who have no other employer but are treated as contingent workers 
without benefits or implicit promises. They also include ways of working that are not, technically, “employment” 
relations under any statute: independent contractors, free-lancers, consultants, and people out of the labor market 
after downsizing or other elimination of former career jobs.”). 
37 Means & Seiner, supra note [ ].  Brishen Rodgers   
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with a malleable test and an indeterminate legal outcome.  Perhaps Judge 
Vince Chhabria  said it best when he noted in ruling on a motion that “the 
jury … will be handed a square peg and asked to choose between two 
round holes.  The test the California courts have developed over the 20th 
Century for classifying workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st 
Century problem . . .”38   
The case Judge Chhabria was hearing was Cotter v. Lyft.   The case 
settled on January 27, 2016, with Lyft paying a settlement of $12 million 
to its drivers. In addition, the company agreed to provide drivers with 
additional due process rights before termination.  As is the case with many 
settlements, it was a compromise for both sides.  While workers did not 
get the employee status they had been seeking, they did at least receive 
some compensation and can no longer be “deactivated” from their 
accounts without going through a grievance process heard by an arbitrator.  
Although Lyft may have dodged liability based on employee status in this 
case, that is no guarantee that the Internal Revenue Service or another 
governmental regulator will reach the same conclusion, despite the 
settlement.39    Because the case was settled, there is no precedential 
effect; and as of now O’Connor v. Uber is set for trial in June of 2016.  
Given Uber’s aggressive legal stance in the past and their unwillingness to 
pay drivers benefits, they seem poised to go forward with the trial.      
While the ridesharing cases are definitely the most high-profile in 
terms of media coverage and sheer number of workers, there are many 
other lawsuits pending within the on-demand economy that go far beyond 
ridesharing.  One arbitrary, but easy, way to start is alphabetically with 
the top of the list,  remarking upon common aspects and insights among 
the cases included. 
 
Table 1.  On-Demand Economy Litigation 
 
 
Casename Case No. Jurisdiction 
Gravamen of 
Litigation 
Status 
Agruss v. 
Homejoy 
1:15-cv-00767 N.D. Ill. 
FLSA; Home 
handyperson 
services 
Class claims 
dismissed without 
prejudice on 
05/05/2015; 
                                         
38 Cotter v. Lyft, No. 13-cv-04065-VC, *19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015).  
39 For an example of a tax case where liability was also imposed by the IRS for employee 
misclassification, see Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996) 
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Homejoy ceased 
operations. 
Shardae 
Bennett v. 
Wash.Io, 
Inc.  
 
BC603067 
 
CA 
Superior 
Court - Los 
Angeles 
County 
Violation of Cal. 
Labor Code  
Sect. 226.8 
Class Action 
Complaint filed 
12/8/2015. No 
response filed to 
date. 
Cobarruviaz 
v. Maplebear  
3:15-cv-00697-
EMC 
 
2015 WL 694112 
N.D. Cal.  
FLSA; Grocery 
delivery service 
app 
Court granted 
Instacart' s 
(Maplebear' s) 
motion to compel 
arbitration on an 
individual basis 
granted except for 
the Private 
Attorney General 
(PAGA) 
representative 
claim. 
Cotter v. 
Lyft 
3:13-cv-04065-
VC 
N.D. Cal.  
Employee 
benefits, cost 
reimbursements; 
Ridesharing/driv
er app 
Settlement 
agreement for $12 
million agreed to 
on 1/27/16.  Due 
process rights on 
termination also 
granted as part of 
settlement. 
Ehret v. 
Uber 
3:14-cv-00113-
EMC 
 
68 F.Supp.3d 
1121 
N.D. Cal.  
Employee 
benefits, cost 
reimbursements; 
Ridesharing/ 
driver app 
Motion to Certify 
Class & 
Consolidate Cases 
granted 10/22/15; 
Case management 
conference set for 
1/28/16. 
Jeung et al.  
v. Yelp 
3:15-cv-02228-
RS 
 
2015 WL 
4776424 
N.D. Cal.  
Unjust 
enrichment / 
Restitution for 
time spent 
writing online 
reviews 
Case dismissed on 
9/29/15. 
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Levin v. Try 
Caviar 
3:15-cv-01285 
 
2015 WL 
7529649 
N.D. Cal.  
FLSA; Grocery 
delivery service 
app 
Individual claims 
sent to arbitration; 
Awaiting further 
briefing on 
Plaintiff’s PAGA 
claims. 
Mohamed v. 
Uber, a/k/a 
In Re Uber 
FCRA 
Litigation 
3:14-cv-05200-
EMC 
Consolidated 
with 
14-cv-05241-
EMC 
15-cv-03009-
EMC 
 
109 F.Supp.3d 
1185 
N.D. Cal.  
Employee 
benefits, cost 
reimbursements; 
Ridesharing/ 
driver app 
Class Certification 
& Motion to 
Consolidate Cases 
granted 10/22/15; 
Defendant’s 
motion to compel 
arbitration denied 
O' Connor v. 
Uber 
3:13-cv-03826-
EMC 
N.D. Cal.  
Employee 
benefits, Cost 
reimbursements; 
Overtime under 
FSLA; 
Ridesharing/ 
Driver app 
Class certified and 
trial was set for 
June, 2016; Uber 
is appealing ruling 
on new mandatory 
arbitration clause 
inserted to driver 
contracts. 
Otey v. 
Crowdflower 
3:12-cv-05524-
JST 
N.D. Cal.  
FLSA; 
Crowdwork 
Settlement 
agreement 
approved by the 
Court.  Parties 
now seeking to 
amend the 
settlement; Court 
denied Motion to 
Modify. 
Rojas-Lozano 
v. Google, 
Inc. 
3:15-cv-03751-
JSC 
 
2015 WL 
4779245 
N.D. Cal.  
FLSA or Unjust 
Enrichment / 
Word 
transcription 
("Captchas") or 
identification for 
Motion to Dismiss 
filed by Google 
heard 12/15; 
Court has 
requested 
supplemental 
10 Miriam A. Cherry [18-Feb-16 
Google Earth 
(without pay) 
briefing. 
Sherry Singer 
et al v. 
Postmates, 
Inc.  
 
 4:15-cv-01284 
JSW 
U.S. 
District 
Court 
California 
Northern 
District 
Violation of 
FLSA and Cal. 
Labor Code 
Sect. 226.8 et 
seq. 
Class Action 
Complaint filed 
3/19/2015. 
Motion for Partial 
Summ. Judgment 
filed by Defendant 
6/2015 
Andrew Tan 
v. Grubhub, 
Inc. 
3:15-cv-05128 N.D. Cal.  
Violation of Cal. 
Labor Code; 
Restaurant/Food 
delivery 
website/app 
Removed from 
state court.  First 
Amended 
Complaint filed 
12/15/16. 
Zenelaj et al.  
v. 
Handybook, 
Inc. 
3:14-cv-05449-
THE 
 
109 F.Supp.3d 
125 
N.D. Cal.  
FLSA; Home 
handyperson 
services 
Parties mediated 
the dispute 
without success.  
Case is headed 
toward 
arbitration. 
 
 
 
The first case listed is Arguss v. Homejoy,40 a case in which 
workers sued a home repair services app for minimum wage violations 
under the FLSA. The case was dismissed on May 5, 2015 as Homejoy had 
filed for bankruptcy and then subsequently ceased operations.41  Boosters 
of the on-demand economy were quick to blame Homejoy’s failure on the 
actions of the workers, in particular their decision to bring a lawsuit.42  
Many prognosticators used this case as a way to raise the salience of these 
employment litigations, noting that increased labor costs might result in 
the demise of existing companies and retard the growth of new on-demand 
                                         
40 Agruss v. Homejoy, 1:15-cv-00767 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 5, 2015).  
41 Daniel D’Addario, Homejoy Cleaning Company Shuts Down,  TIME,  July 18, 2015, available at 
http://time.com/3963565/homejoy-cleaning-shuts-down/ 
42Kia Kokalitheva, Startup Homejoy Bites the Dust – Literally,  FORTUNE,  July 17, 2015, available at 
http://fortune.com/2015/07/17/homejoy-closing-cleaning-google/ (noting lack of venture funding for company 
as well as labor lawsuit woes); Sarah Kessler, The Gig Economy Won’t Last Because It’s Being Sued to Death,  
FAST COMPANY (Feb. 17, 2015),  http://www.fastcompany.com/3042248/the-gig-economy-wont-last-because-
its-being-sued-to-death.  
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apps.43   
The rhetoric that Homejoy failed because its workers sued for 
minimum wage and overtime protections failed to establish a key element:  
causality.  While labor unrest is certainly not good for business,  it is not 
clear that paying workers minimum wage was the cause of Homejoy’s 
bankruptcy filings.  In fact,  Homejoy’s business model was in financial 
trouble before the company’s legal troubles began,  because the company 
overextended itself chasing new customers on bargain websites like 
Groupon.44  Homejoy then could not retain customers and suffered from 
quality control issues. 45  As such, it would be overblown to conclude from 
only this one isolated example that paying workers minimum wage would 
mean the immediate bankruptcy of the on demand economy.  Some have 
claimed that perhaps these new businesses should receive an exemption 
from minimum wage either because they are involved in sharing or 
because they involve new jobs. 46  Regardless, the argument that on-
demand companies should somehow be exempt from minimum wage 
because otherwise their business models and very existence would be at 
risk is a problematic argument.   In the United States, the requirement of a 
minimum wage was established as a response to downward wage spirals in 
the Great Depression.47  Wage and hour laws are requirements of general 
applicability to all businesses; and it  is difficult to see why they would not 
apply to on-demand economy companies.48   
Indeed, many of the “sharing” companies of yesteryear have 
moved away from “sharing” and in fact are fully for-profit businesses 
pursuing a shareholder value maximization model at all costs, often driven 
by the  demands of their venture capitalist investors.  In addition, even 
true non-profits must pay minimum wage to their regular employees.  
And, while cell phone apps and online markets for work may be new, the 
                                         
43 Carmel DeAmicis, Homejoy Shuts Down After Battling Worker Classification Lawsuits,  RE/CODE,  July 
17, 2015, available at http://recode.net/2015/07/17/cleaning-services-startup-homejoy-shuts-down-after-
battling-worker-classification-lawsuits/ (interview with co-founder of Homejoy blaming misclassification 
lawsuits and legal woes for company’s shutdown)  
44 Ellen Huet,  What Really Killed Homejoy? It Couldn’t Hold on to its Customers,  FORBES,  Jul. 23, 2015 
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/23/what-really-killed-homejoy-it-couldnt-hold-onto-
its-customers/#764ce4f5114c (“Former employees [stated that]… the startup pushed relentlessly for high growth 
numbers instead of fixing its poor retention rates, which persisted both because Homejoy relied too heavily on 
deal sites like Groupon for new customers and failed to improve its core service because it couldn’t train its 
independent contractor cleaners.”).  
45 Id.   Of course, a lack of control, quality or otherwise, is a problem when using independent contractors 
who truly are independent.  
46 Seth Harris & Alan Kreuger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Law for Twenty-First Century Work: 
The “Independent Worker,” THE HAMILTON PROJECT,  Discussion Paper 2015-10 (Dec. 2015), available at 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger_h
arris.pdf. 
47 See Cherry,  A Minimum Wage for Crowdwork,  supra note [ ]. 
48 Id.  
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roles of driver, cleaner, and errand runner are well-established.  The tasks 
that these workers perform are by no means new jobs, even if those jobs 
are enabled, enhanced, or made more efficient by technology.         
The Zenalaj v. Handybook case (last alphabetically but similar in 
business and work tasks to Homejoy) involves a similar dispute over 
misclassification for housecleaners booked through cell phone apps.49  
Handybook, which goes about its business as “Handy,” is being sued by 
workers for alleged wage and hour violations under the FLSA.  
Interestingly, at this point the case predominantly involves the question of 
whether these worker complaints are appropriate to be heard in 
arbitration.50  Increasingly, this has become an issue throughout the 
economy as many employers (as well as website operators and stores) 
attempt to minimize liability though mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in form contracts or EULAs.51  In this case, the court was inclined 
to enforce these arbitration provisions.52  As of this writing, the workers 
were entering mediations with the company to try to resolve the issues.53  
The next case, Bennett v. Washio involves an alleged state labor 
law violation for a dry-cleaning delivery service.  I group this litigation 
along with Tan v. Grubhub54and Singer v. Postmates,  both cases involving 
restaurant delivery services.   A similar case is pending against Instacart, a 
                                         
49 Zenalaj v. Handybook, 109 F.Supp.3d 125 (2015).  
50 Id.  
51 While not the main topic of this article, a longstanding trend has been the growth of these arbitration 
provisions and courts’ willingness to enforce them, even when they seem one-sided and the product of 
adhesion contracts.  For an old look at many of the arbitration issues as they appeared in 1998, see Miriam A. 
Cherry, Note, Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration,  21 HARVARD WOMEN’S L.  J. 267 (1998).  For more updated and 
recent accounts of the movement toward arbitration as a way of managing workplace liability for employers, 
see Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to 
Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2015)  (“Today employers, with 
substantial assistance from the Supreme Court, are using mandatory arbitration clauses to “disarm” employees, 
effectively preventing them from bringing most individual or class claims and thereby obtaining access to justice. 
It has been estimated that roughly 20% of the non-unionized American workforce is covered by mandatory 
arbitration provisions, and this number may well increase.”)  For more on arbitration as a method of containing 
costs toward consumers, see Theodore Eisenberg et. al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of 
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008) (“We 
provide the first study of varying use of arbitration clauses across contracts within the same firms. Using a 
sample of 26 consumer contracts and 164 nonconsumer contracts from large public corporations, we compared 
the use of arbitration clauses in firms' consumer and nonconsumer contracts. Over three-quarters of the consumer 
agreements provided for mandatory arbitration but less than 10% of the firms' material nonconsumer, 
nonemployment contracts included arbitration clauses. The absence of arbitration provisions in the vast majority 
of material contracts suggests that, ex ante, many firms value, even prefer, litigation over arbitration to resolve 
disputes with peers. Our data suggest that the frequent use of arbitration clauses in the same firms' consumer 
contracts may be an effort to preclude aggregate consumer action rather than, as often claimed, an effort to 
promote fair and efficient dispute resolution.”); But see Christopher Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do 
Businesses Use (or not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 433-4 (2010). 
52 Zenalaj v. Handybook, 109 F.Supp.3d 125 (2015).   A court’s decision to enforce an arbitration 
agreement will be influenced by many factors under state law, and that analysis is largely beyond the scope of 
the present article. 
53 Id.  
54 Tan v. Grubhub, 3:15-cv-05128 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  
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grocery delivery service.  The Instacart case is styled as Cobarruviaz v. 
Maplebear.55  Interestingly, in response to this litigation and the attention 
that it received, Instacart made the decision to reclassify its grocery 
shoppers as employees.56  The reasoning from the company was that 
employee classification would allow for stability in its workforce, as well 
as allow for training and quality control.57  Instacart noted that choosing 
groceries actually took skill, and if the company was to make an 
investment in training, they wanted those trained workers remaining with 
the company.58  Even though that litigation is still pending, one assumes 
that on a going-forward basis, the issue of which workers are independent 
contractors and which are employees will be a moot point. 
Continuing with the list, a case that was of interest but was then 
dismissed was Jeung v. Yelp.59  The Yelp site exists for the purpose of 
rating everything commercial – restaurants, bars, hotels, car dealerships – 
and anyone who is a Yelp member can write a review, variously praising 
or ranting about the service received, value for the money, or any other 
aspect of the business that they deem relevant, subject to certain 
guidelines.60  While many people treat writing Yelp reviews as an 
occasional pastime, or something to do only in the event of truly awful or 
outstanding service, others spend a considerable amount of time on the 
site.  In fact, some reviewers become so well-known that others rely on 
them for advice and recommendations.  While Yelp does not pay for 
reviews, these types of active content-contributors help it build value on 
its site.  Therefore over the years, Yelp has sought to encourage loyalty 
among its most active and well-respected reviewers by awarding them 
“Elite” status along with certain perks.61   
The plaintiffs in Jeung v. Yelp case alleged that they were entitled 
to minimum wage for time spent writing customer reviews on the Yelp 
website.  In the alternative, the plaintiffs argued that they should be 
entitled to recover in unjust enrichment for restitution.62  After all,  Yelp 
                                         
55 Cobarruviaz v. Maplebear, 2015 WL 694112 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  
56  Sara Ashley O’Brien, The Uber Effect: Instacart Shifts away from Contract Workers,  CNN MONEY 
(New York), June 22, 2015, http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/22/technology/  
instacart-employee-option/ 
57 Davey Alba, Instacart Shoppers Can Now Choose to be Real Employees,  WIRED,  Jun. 22, 2015, 
available at http://www.wired.com/2015/06/instacart-shoppers-can-now-choose-real-employees/ (discussing 
reasons that company made the switch to part-time employees, which included training and quality control).  
58 Id.  
59 Jeung v. Yelp, 2015 WL 4776424 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  
60 www.yelp.com 
61 Lydia O’Connor, Yelp Reviewers File Class Action Lawsuit Claiming They are Unpaid Writers,  THE 
HUFFINGTON POST,  Oct. 31, 2013 available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/30/yelp-lawsuit-
_n_4179663.html.  
62 Also known as an action in quasi-contract or quantum meruit,  unjust enrichment is an alternative to 
contract theory.  Here, there was no express contract between Yelp and the reviewers, but under an unjust 
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would hardly be a valuable site without the content written by its crowd of 
users.  Finally, the plaintiffs argued that they had been injured when their 
status as “Elite” reviewers was taken away from them and when their 
accounts were deactivated.   However, on June 19, 2015, Jeung v. Yelp 
was dismissed. The court characterized the dismissal as essentially a 
default judgement.  Plaintiffs’ counsel had filed some questionable and 
bizarre filings before abandoning the case.63   
Another case about unpaid work on the Internet is Rojas-Lazano v. 
Google.64  Here,  plaintiffs sued Google for the value of work done on an 
unpaid basis for Google without knowledge.  How could someone work 
without being aware of it?  Most Internet users are familiar with the 
process during posting a comment on a web blog or signing up for a 
mailing list where they are asked to input a code of letters and numbers to 
establish that they are a real person, and not an automated program (or 
“bot”).  The codes that websites ask users to input are known as 
“captchas” or “recaptchas.”  The plaintiffs in this case argued that when 
they were inputting these captchas to verify that they weren’t bots, they 
were also working for Google.   
Google had been putting small bits of transcription work (for books 
or Google Earth) up on the web through the vehicle of the captchas.  
While filling out a captcha only took a few seconds, as millions of people 
posted comments on blogs or signed up for a website, in the aggregate this 
added up to quite an outstanding amount of time.  Most people just 
thought they were establishing personhood, and even after the lawsuit,  
most people do not know that they are actually generating profit for 
Google every time they enter a captcha.  However, as the plaintiffs in 
Yeung v. Yelp found out, the landscape for plaintiffs for these types of 
unpaid online work, just based on what little existing precedent there is 
unwelcoming.      
A dispute over payment for blog posts illustrates the unfriendly 
reception such cases have received in the courts.   The case involved the 
Huffington Post, a popular weblog that serves as a forum for current news 
events and left-leaning political commentary.65  Leading up to the 2008 
                                                                                                       
enrichment theory, no agreement is necessary.  It is enough if a benefit was conferred, there was an appreciation 
of the benefit, and then acceptance and retention of the benefit.  For more generally on unjust enrichment, see 
e.g. See, e.g. Caprice Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement as a Moral Compass of Breach of Contract,  77 U. 
CINN. L. REV. 991 (2009); Caprice Roberts, A Commonwealth of Perspective on Restitutionary Disgorgement 
for Breach of Contract,  65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945 (2008). 
63 Eric Goldman, Court Says Yelp Reviewers Aren’t Employees,  FORBES,  Aug. 17 2015, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2015/08/17/court-says-yelp-reviewers-arent-
employees/#512432103fec. 
64 Rojas-Lazano v. Google, 2015 WL 4779245 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  
65 www.huffingtonpost.com. 
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election, many Huffington Post bloggers wrote accounts critical of then-
President George W. Bush, specifically his administration’s treatment of 
the Guantanamo Bay prisoners, while others wrote to assist fellow 
Democratic voters to become more familiar with the primary candidates.66  
Regardless of one’s personal political leanings,  what is certain is that the 
website was able to attract a relatively sophisticated level of writing in its 
posts.67  The featured authors included professional journalists and 
attorneys who contributed their efforts to the Huffington Post for free,  
despite normally being paid for their writing.  Freshly updated content 
helped attract an additional audience to the blog, which grew rapidly, 
reaching 15 million hits per weekday. 68 
In March 2011 media giant AOL submitted a $315 million 
acquisition bid for the Huffington Post.69  The web traffic that was driven 
to the HuffPo website was valuable to AOL, a company that had been 
searching both for more content providers and an expanded audience for 
existing content.  Arianna Huffington and her financial backers stood to 
make a handsome profit from the acquisition.  The bloggers, on the other 
hand, who had built the blog’s readership by dint of their hard work, were 
to receive nothing.70    Frustrated, Jonathan Tasini, a journalist and labor 
activist,71 along with other unpaid bloggers, filed a lawsuit challenging the 
terms of the deal. 72  The bloggers claimed that as their hard work had built 
the blog’s value, they therefore deserved a share of the profits, either 
through a contract claim or a claim for unjust enrichment and restitution.73 
                                         
66See e.g.  Shayana Kadidal, Guantanamo, Six Years Later,  HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 2008)  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shayana-kadidal/guantanamo-six-years-late_b_81025.html;  For the Huffington 
Post’s current stance on this issue, see Ben Fox, Guantanamo Closure Hopes Fade as Prison Turns Ten,  
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/10/guantanamo-closure-
anniversary_n_1195984.html.  
67 See Paul Farhi, Freelancer to File Class-Action Suit Against HuffPo and AOL Over Compensation,  
WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifesytle/style/freelancer-to-file-
class-action-suit-aainst-huffpost-and-aol-over-compensation/2011/04/12/AFa9QGQD_story.html.  
68 Nate Silver, The Economics of Blogging and the Huffington Post,  NYTIMES.COM (Feb. 12, 2011), 
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/the-economics-of-blogging-and-the-huffington-post/ 
(estimating 15 million page hits per weekday on HuffPo and analyzing types of posts and attention they 
typically were attracting). 
69 Id.  See also Julianne Pepitone, Huffington Post blogger sues AOL for $105 million,  CNNMONEY.COM 
(Apr. 12, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/12/technology/huffington_post_blogger_lawsuit/index.htm. 
70 Jeff Berovici, AOL, Arianna Huffington Hit with Class Action Suit,  FORBES.COM (April 12, 2011),  
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2011/04/12/aol-arianna-huffington-hit-with-class-action-
suit/.  See also Tim Rutten, AOL? HuffPo.  The Loser? Journalism,  L.A.  TIMES,  Feb. 9, 2011, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/09/opinion/la-oe-rutten-column-huffington-aol-20110209 (“To grasp its 
business model… you need to picture a galley rowed by slaves and commanded by pirates.”).  
71 Jonathan Tasini was previous the successful lead plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging the rights of 
newspapers to license the work of freelance writers to electronic databases without additional compensation.  
See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (ruling in favor of freelance writers).  
72 See Tasini v. AOL Inc., Class Action Complaint, 11 CV 2472 (April 12, 2011) (SDNY).  
73 The claim would be that, although a formal contract was lacking, the organizers of the Huffington Post 
were unjustly enriched and a restitution theory would be applied to compensate the bloggers.  Do Huffington 
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The heart of the Huffington Post bloggers’ claims seemed to rest,  
as many contract disputes do, in the differing expectations that the parties 
brought with them to the deal.  From the bloggers’ perspective, they 
performed work without payment because they believed that they were 
contributing to a political website that advanced the causes in which they 
believed.  Retroactively, they learned that the founders of the website 
were to profit from the Huffington Post, and they therefore felt taken 
advantage of by the organizers. 74  On the other hand, the Huffington Post 
claimed that the bloggers did receive a substantial benefit,  as they used the 
HuffPo “to connect and help their work be seen by as many people as 
possible.  It’s the same reason people go on TV shows: to promote their 
views and ideas.”75  In other words, according to the HuffPo, the blog 
provided unknown writers with an important benefit: a platform for 
expression and free publicity to a growing audience. 76    The District 
Court sided with the HuffPo and dismissed the bloggers’ complaint, which 
was then affirmed by the Second Circuit.77   Perhaps as a delayed reaction, 
the Huffington Post writers unionized in January 2016.78 
The last case for discussion in this section is Otey v. Crowdflower.79  
Crowdflower is a crowdworking platform that hired thousands of workers 
both in the US and globally to carry out small micro-tasks.  Unlike Uber, 
which involves a platform matching up a driver who is performing a 
service in the real world, Otey involved work performed solely on 
computer.  In this type of crowdwork, large tasks such as constructing a 
website is broken down into its constituent parts such as coding, tagging, 
and describing items or pictures.80  Platforms then farm out these micro-
tasks to hundreds or thousands of individual workers across the world.  
After completion the tasks are then re-aggregated and compiled to finish 
the job.  Workers sued Crowdflower for failure to pay minimum wage 
under the FLSA and Oregon’s minimum wage law.  The workers’ 
allegations were coextensive with media coverage describing the poor 
                                                                                                       
Post Bloggers Deserve to Get Paid?,  LAW BLOG,  WSJ.COM,  available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/04/12/should-huffington-post-bloggers-get-paid/tab/print/.  
74 The unpaid bloggers posted on the Twitter account #huffpuff, claiming that the HuffPo “built a blog-
empire on the backs of thousands of citizen journalists.”  
75 Jeremy W. Peters, Huffington Post Is Target of Suit on Behalf of Bloggers,  NYTIMES.COM (Apr. 12, 
2011), available at http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/huffington-post-is-target-of-suit-on-
behalf-of-bloggers/?pagemode= print.  
76 Id.  For academic commentary discussing the rise of amateurism and peer production of blogs, see, e.g.  
John Quiggen & Dan Hunter, Money Ruins Everything,  30 HASTINGS COMM.  & ENT.  L.  J. 203, 220 (2008).  
77 Tasini v. AOL, Inc., F.Supp.2d 734, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d No. 12-1428-cv, 2012 WL 61766559 
at *1 (2nd Cir. Dec. 12, 2012).  
78 Frank Pallotta, Huffington Post Becomes Biggest Unionized Digital Media Outlet,  CNN MONEY,  Jan. 
14, 2016, available at http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/14/media/huffington-post-union/index.html 
79 Otey v. Crowdflower, 3:12-cv-05524-JST (N.D. Cal. 2013).  
80 See Randall Stross, When the Assembly Line Moves Online,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Oct. 30, 2010. 
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wages of crowdwork.81  Crowdflower unsurprisingly argued that these 
platform workers were independent contractors, not employees.   
Before the issue could be decided, however, the case moved into 
settlement negotiations.  During the first round of negotiations, the parties 
reached an agreement by which Crowdflower would compensate for the 
difference between what workers were paid and the statutory minimum 
wage.  They also agreed to pay for attorney’s fees and to cease operations 
as a crowdwork platform for a period of ten years.  Judge Tigar, however,  
rejected the settlement as inadequate. The revised settlement increased the 
amount of monetary compensation for plaintiffs, including administrative 
costs and attorney’s fees to $585,507,  but contained no ban on 
Crowdflower continuing to broker crowdwork.   
The monetary settlement in the Crowdflower case surely encouraged 
other plaintiffs and their attorneys to bring suit.   How were the plaintiffs 
in this case able to succeed in brokering the settlement?  Their success can 
likely be traced back to the statements of Crowdflower’s CEO.   Although 
the videos referenced in the complaint have been taken off YouTube, the 
complaint alleged that these videos had the CEO noting that he did not 
have to pay workers minimum wage.  In an interview with the BBC the 
record of which is still available online, the CEO stated that “we almost 
trick the game players into doing something useful for the world while 
playing these games.  Just do ten minutes of real work that a real company 
can use, and we’ll give you a virtual tractor.  That way everyone wins.” 82  
Altogether, that would establish a willing violation of the minimum wage 
laws.  Such a knowing and intentional violation that would then be 
established could result in treble damages.  It is entirely viable to suggest 
that Crowdflower did not want to risk such a result; at various points in 
the litigation it pled poverty and noted that paying workers minimum wage 
would bankrupt the company.  Ironically, Crowdflower received a large 
venture capital investment only a short time after the settlement. 
Having reviewed the cases listed from the chart, note that there are 
a number of remarkable commonalities.  The vast majority of the litigation 
                                         
81 See, e.g.  Alyson Shontell, My Nightmare Experience as a Task Rabbit Drone,  BUSINESS INSIDER,  Dec. 
7, 2011, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/confessions-of-a-task-rabbit-2011-12 (noting no guarantee 
of minimum wage); Moshe Z. Marvit, How Crowdworkers Became the Ghosts in the Digital Machine,  THE 
NATION,  Feb. 24, 2014, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/178241/how-crowdworkers-became-
ghosts-digital-machine (recounting stories of two workers on AMT who earned less than minimum wage);  
Randall Stross, When the Assembly Line Moves Online,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Oct. 30, 2010 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/business/31digi.html; Matthew Bingham & Joseph Dunn, Wanted: Digital 
Drones to Earn ½  p an Hour,  SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), Jan. 11, 2009 (journalists performing tasks on the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk and earning a little over $2 for four hour’s work).  
82 Fiona Graham, Crowdsourcing Work: Labour on Demand or Digital Sweatshop?,  BBC NEWS,  Oct. 22, 
2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/business-11600902. 
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is taking place in federal court, in the Northern district of California.  
There are several reasons for this geographic anomaly.  First,  the Bay 
Area is the natural testing ground for many of the start-up businesses in 
the on-demand economy.  With its close proximity to Silicon Valley,  
many of the platforms use the neighborhood near them in order to 
experiment and build their brands.  The other point about this, however, is 
that California also has enacted generally plaintiff-friendly labor laws.83  
This makes California an attractive jurisdiction for plaintiffs to file class 
actions.  These cases are important to watch because there is a “first 
mover”  effect.  There is no precedential value from one case to another,  
or even from one district or circuit to another.  When faced with a 
difficult and new fact pattern, however, judges often try to learn from and 
rely on the work done by the courts that have already put in the time and 
effort to resolve the dispute in the first instance.84       
The chart excludes decisions by administrative entities.   These 
mostly have dealt with individual state law claims.85  Other issues that did 
not quite make it onto the chart but are important nonetheless are Uber’s 
widespread lobbying in various states to have its workers continue as 
independent contractors.  In fact, Uber has pressed state legislators to pass 
“model codes” for the regulation of on-demand transportation companies.  
While such codes make sense from the perspective of wanting drivers to 
have insurance and minimum licensing requirements, Uber has sneakily 
inserted provisions about labor laws.  Uber’s model transportation 
legislation contains language that says its workers are independent 
contractors.  Aside from indicating industry capture, such legislation may 
not have much meaning for worker status.  For each statute (e.g.  FLSA, 
unemployment, worker’s compensation) has its own individual definition 
of employee elaborated by the courts.  Having another definition randomly 
inserted in the transportation code will likely not be dispositive of the 
issue, despite Uber’s efforts.  
At the time of this writing, no clear consensus has emerged on how 
the courts will determine employee versus independent contractor status 
for workers in the on-demand economy.  As noted above, the legal tests 
for discerning such status are largely malleable and based on past 
                                         
83 See, e.g. Alan Hyde, High Velocity Labor Market. 
84 The Uber case thus literally becomes the Uber case. 
85 The California Labor Commission made headlines in ruling that Uber driver Barbara Berwick was an 
employee and thus entitled to reimbursement for certain work-related expenses.  Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
No. 11-46739 EK (Cal. 2015), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/268980201/Uber-v-Berwick-California-
Labor-Commission-Ruling#scribd.  Other administrative bodies have been split, with a Florida administrative 
decision that an Uber drive was an independent contractor.  See Davey Alba, Florida Says Uber Driver Isn’t an 
Employee After All,  WIRED,  Oct. 1, 2016, available at http://www.wired.com/2015/10/florida-uber-decision-
reversal/.  
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precedent, largely indeterminate.  It is only after we pass the threshold 
questions of whether these workers are employees that we will get to some 
of the more substantive regulatory issues.  Crowdwork litigation is 
important because it ties into vexing meta-questions about the future of 
work.  The next section explores these larger concerns. 
 
II.  THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY AND THE  
DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF WORK  
           
The previous section provided an update on litigation in the on-
demand economy.   Apart from the issues being explored in the cases, 
(most of which are still in their early stages), it is important to take a step 
back and examine the larger context of how work is changing with 
respone to technology.  The framework for the discussion in this section 
relies upon Katherine Van Wezel Stone’s book From Widgets to Digits.86  
I propose adding the category of “crowdwork” to the model of industrial 
and digital work that Stone articulates.   
Stone’s book describes the changing landscape of work toward the 
end of the millennium.87  As she notes, the United States has been in the 
process of moving from an industrial,  manufacturing-based economy to a 
knowledge-based one. 88 The old manufacturing economy was 
characterized by the “life cycle” model of employment. 89  Promotion 
throughout a career was achieved through vertical job ladders and was 
structured hierarchically.90  Original thought and creativity were largely 
downplayed.  In the manufacturing economy jobs were often broken down 
into their constituent parts, and job training was not important, nor 
expected.  Loyalty and longevity, however, were prized traits as they 
helped to manage the workforce, and workers were rewarded with benefits 
that depended on longevity.  Unions were an expected representation of 
stable, long-term employee interests.        
The known characteristics of the industrial system owed much to 
earlier theorizing about how best to maximize the productivity of workers. 
Apart from the notion of the invisible hand, Adam Smith wrote of the 
division of labor among pin makers as a method of increasing production.  
91  Frederick Taylor further refined the deconstruction of work through 
                                         
86 See generally KATHERINE V.W.  STONE,  FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS (2004). 
87 KATHERINE V.W.  STONE,  FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS 67-77 (2004) (describing major changes and shifts 
in the economy as there is a transition in the U.S. away from manufacturing jobs).  
88 Id.  
89 Id.  at 54-55. 
90 Id.  at 60. 
91 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, ch. 1 (“To take an example, therefore, from a very trifling 
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so-called scientific management.92  So-called “Taylorism”  sought to 
calibrate each worker’s actions to achieve the highest level of efficiency.93  
The assembly lines and social welfare policies of Ford Motor Company 
took these principles into account.   Ford wanted a stable and loyal 
workforce, and in order to get that, he had to pay higher wages to those 
performing repetitious and occasionally hazardous tasks.  94 
The shift to a knowledge-based, information-rich economy at the 
end of the millennium also engendered a shift to a new model of work.95  
Some of the characteristics of the new digital work described by Stone are 
an increased emphasis on worker knowledge, training and skills.   The 
digital era, as Stone defines, refers to mid to late 20th century, when 
computers and the internet became “the central nervous system of global 
production networks.”96  Based on a shift towards fluid workplaces and 
permeable borders between firms, the digital model places a high value on  
the intellectual capital of employees. 97    Gone was the idea of a “life 
cycle” model of employment.  Instead, workers had shorter job tenure,  
and were expected to advance by moving horizontally across different 
firms.98  Worker loyalty, having been eroded by mass layoffs and 
movement of manufacturing jobs overseas in the 1980s, was instead 
replaced by the notion of “employability.”99  Rather than seeking the 
elusive idea of job security, workers instead focused on increasing their 
job skills and remaining competitive within the market external to the 
firm.   
Other characteristics of this new digital model included the  
flattening of organizations and subtracting middle management.   As 
workers are hired for their knowledge and expertise, their employment 
often was centered around a certain project or projects. 100  While 
employment might not last beyond a particular project, workers were 
often promised opportunities to enhance their skills to provide motivation.  
                                                                                                       
manufacture; but one in which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of the pin-
maker; a workman not educated to this business (which the division of labour has rendered a distinct trade), nor 
acquainted with the use of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same division of labour has 
probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, make one pin in a day, and certainly 
could not make twenty. But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a 
peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades. 
92 See generally FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR,  PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 31 (1911).  
93 Stone, supra note [ ], at 34-36. 
94 Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (classic corporate law case discussing 
Ford’s management style of paying above prevailing wages for assembly line workers). 
95 Stone, supra note [ ], at 44-45. 
96 Id.  at 5. 
97 Id.  at 92 (describing what Stone terms the “boundaryless career”).  
98 Id.  at 96. 
99 Id.  at 74. 
100 Id.  at 111. 
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Some forms of these knowledge jobs will tout the ability to network with 
others, increasing the chance of other horizontal job opportunities.  Job 
changes and moves are common in this new digital model of work. 101   
The rest of Stone’s book centers on describing the ways in which the 
traditional labor law model falls short in protecting the needs and rights of 
worker in the new digital model.  She especially calls for legal reform 
around the issue of non-competition clauses, which prevent workers from 
using their skills and their network for rival firms. 102   
How does the recent development of crowdwork fit with the 
industrial or digital model?  Many would be quick to classify crowdwork 
as another branch or outgrowth of the digital knowledge work model.  
After all,  crowdwork is intermediated by technology, whether that is by 
cell phone app or via the Internet, and some forms of crowdwork take 
place solely in cyberspace.  Crowdwork takes place by the project, 
indeed, with small gigs or microlabor on the Internet, workers are only 
hired for one particular task, even if that task takes only seconds or 
minutes.103  The focus on work by the project also seems to be a 
commonality between crowdwork and digital work.  However, some 
aspects of crowdworking look more like a throwback to the earlier 
industrial model.   In fact, the idea of breaking down tasks to their lowest 
common denominator is nothing new – in fact it is paradigmatic 
Taylorism.  The analysis here is to focus on two features of crowdwork:  
automatic management of workers through computer code coupled with 
what has been termed “precarity.”      
A salient feature of crowdwork infrastructure is the predominance 
of code in mediating work relations.  The literature refers to this process 
as automatic management or “algocracy.”104  Indeed, a new trend is that 
algorithms are absorbing many organizational functions that managers 
traditionally would perform.  Computer code may perform a variety of 
supervisory tasks from the mundane to the sophisticated:  assigning tasks 
to workers, speeding up work processes, determining the timing and 
length of breaks, monitoring quality, ranking employee, and more.  Code 
makes crucial on-the-spot decisions about individualized employees and 
what they need to be doing in real time.  Labor practices that used to be 
run through bureaucracy (and other organizational control regimes) are 
becoming embedded within computer programs.  Workers are directed by 
                                         
101 Id.  at 74. 
102 Id.  at 127-156.  
103 See Stross, supra note [ ] (describing short time frame for tasks in crowdsourced micro-labor). 
104 A. Aneesh, Global Labor:  Algocratic Modes of Organization,  27(4) SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY,  347 
(2009).  
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imperatives programmed into the algorithms, which replace the traditional 
external schemes carried out by managers.  
Amazon Mechanical Turk provides one example of such automatic 
management. 105   Built into the code are easy filtering criteria for selection 
of workers, performance assessment of their work, and the provision of 
incentives, whether positive or negative.  Significantly, communication 
and dispute resolution are almost entirely absent from automatic 
management systems.  Communication and dispute resolution systems are 
neither time nor cost-efficient for the employer.  As noted by one task 
assigner, “the time spent looking at the email costs more than what you 
paid them [the worker]”106  
Uber also embraces the idea of automatic management.107  Rather 
than conduct background checks, having a dispatch system, or spot checks 
by supervisors, Uber has essentially outsourced its quality control to its 
passengers.108  Upon the completion of a ride, passengers are asked to rate 
their driver on a scale of one to five, with five stars as the best score.  The 
ratings are then averaged in order to provide a composite score.   If a 
driver has their customer satisfaction rating fall below a certain average,  
they can no longer sign in to the app.  They are essentially booted off 
Uber and can no longer sign in.  Currently the threshold for being cut off 
is high, approximately 4.7 out of five stars. 109  Some have alleged that 
these ratings could be reflecting racial or religious bias, whether conscious 
or unconscious and are problematic as such.110  In fact, the idea of the 
automatic deactivation or “firing by algorithm” has proven to be so 
unpopular with drivers that the recent Lyft settlement addressed it.   One 
major point of the settlement in Cotter v. Lyft was that drivers received the 
right to an arbitration hearing before their dismissal.  No longer can Lyft 
                                         
105 Lily Irani & Six Silberman, Turkopticon: Interrupting Worker Invisibility in Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS, AIM, April 4, 2013. 
106 Id.  
107 Elizabeth Dwoskin, At Uber, the Algorithm is more Controlling Than the Real Boss,  WALL ST.  J.  
BLOG,  Nov. 4,  2015, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/11/04/uber-as-employer-the-boss-is-an-
algorithm/.  
108 Alex Rosenblatt & Luke Stark, Uber’s Driver: Information Asymmetries and Control in Dynamic Work, 
*11, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 2686227. 
109 Id.  at 12 (noting that it is never explained to riders that a “4” is a dangerously low rating); Samantha 
Allen, The Mysterious Way Uber Bans Drivers,  THE DAILY BEAST,  Jan. 27, 2015, available at 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/27/the-mysterious-way-uber-bans-drivers.html. 
110 Noah Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Gig Economy Outside Employment Law,  ON LABOR,  Jan. 19 
2016, available at http://onlabor.org/author/noahzatzonlabor/.  There is also another phenomenon whereby 
drivers also rate their passengers.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, some passengers are shocked to realize that they 
have low ratings, and some have wondered if this is due to racial or ethnic bias by drivers, or in some 
instances, a failure by women to “flirt” or act submissively.  Nancy Leong, Uber, Privacy, and Discrimination,  
THE RIGHTS BLOG,  April 20,  2013 available at http://www.nancyleong.com/race-2/uber-privacy-
discrimination/.   
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dismiss workers by booting them from an app.111     
Understanding the growth of crowdwork also requires attention to 
a second trend:  the expansion of precarious labor. By “precarious,” 
scholars are referring to labor that is more than just part-time and 
temporary.  The notion encompasses a deeper undercutting of reliability 
and security in labor systems.  Arne Kalleberg discusses precarious work 
as work that is uncertain, unpredictable, and risky.112  Stone also refers to 
work that has no explicit promise of continuity.  This notion of precarious 
work spans the range of occupations.   This degradation of labor is felt by 
the full range of workers, from fast food service, to retail worker, to 
engineering consultants.  
Kalleberg charts dramatic trends.  Through precarious labor 
systems, we are seeing an increasing likelihood of unemployment, a 
growth of general job insecurity, expanding contingent and nonstandard 
work, and risk-shifting (that is, the transfer of labor expenses like health 
insurance and pensions from the employer to the employee).  Impacts on 
the daily lives of workers can be problematic.  For working parents, the 
rise of “just in time” scheduling means difficulty in arranging childcare.   
Furthermore, precarious labor can put workers in a trap:  while a 
worker might need an extra job to survive, having a second job means that 
the scheduling may get a worker fired from the first.113  Precarious labor 
has been particularly pernicious in service and retail jobs where women 
and people of color predominate.  However, one of the important markers 
of precarious labor is how it is moving up the occupational ladder.   
Increasingly, jobs in knowledge work and information are experience 
precarity as well, which leads to our next point. 
Micro labor is identified for its small scope, short duration, tiny 
output, and limited remuneration.  At the same time, it is characterized by 
an opposing feature:  massive scale.  Employees doing tiny jobs are being 
hired and aggregated in huge numbers.  For employers, the gain is 
substantial productivity out of legions of low-paid micro-workers.  For 
employees, however, their livelihoods are increasingly dependent on 
searching and carrying out tiny tasks.  Promises of micro labor are 
enticing:  
 
                                         
111 Of course, establishing industrial due process does undercut the idea that Lyft drivers are independent 
contractors, and regardless of what the settlement says, another governmental or regulatory agency could decide 
that these workers are employees, notwithstanding the settlement. 
112 Arne L. Kalleberg, Precarious Work: Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in Transition,  74 AM.  
SOCIOLOGICAL REV.  1 (2009).  
113 LINDA TIRADO,  HAND TO MOUTH: LIVING IN BOOTSTRAP AMERICA (2014) (describing challenges of 
working multiple jobs with precarious hours and schedules). 
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The work will come to you, via apps on your smartphone, making 
the process of finding work as easy as checking your Twitter feed. 
Whatever you do, it will be your choice. Because you are no 
longer just an employee with set hours and wages working to make 
someone else rich. In the future, you will be your very own mini-
business.114 
 
Indeed, there are many advantages to crowdwork in terms of easy access, 
quick turnaround, and flexible scheduling. 115 
In fact,  these trends in crowdwork represent a new phase in 
employment.  Table 2 illustrates the digital transformation of work more 
completely.   Spinning off of the classic model of “industrial” 
employment, the information society has spurred not just the one 
additional stage, but a third, focused on crowdwork.  This “crowdwork” 
system of employment is focused on precariousness, completion of small 
discrete tasks (microlabor) and promises of job flexibility.   
 
Table 2.  Transformation of Employment Systems: 
Industrial, Digital, Crowdwork116 
 
 Employment Systems 
 
Features of Job 
Industrial Digital Crowdwork 
Training Firm-Specific General None 
Structure of 
Tasks 
Jobs, Narrowly-
defined  
Projects,  Broadly-
defined  
Tasks, Micro-
defined  
Location of Work Employer’s Office Variable,  Often the 
Worker’s Home 
Variable,  Often  
Online or the Task-
Poster’s Home, 
Office, Etc. 
Duration of Work Employee’s 
Lifetime 
Weeks, Months, 
Years 
Hours, Minutes, 
Seconds 
Decision-Making Hierarchical 
Supervision and 
Evaluation 
Peer Group Automatic 
Management 
Authority 
Relations 
Top-Down, 
Command and 
Control 
Bounded Discretion Automatic 
Management  
                                         
114 Kessler at 2. 
115 Indeed, Means & Seiner, supra note [ ] at FN [ ] comb through many company websites and reproduce 
their promises of flexibility for workers.  Unfortunately, Means & Seiner advocate only using flexibility to 
determine independent contractor status without looking at the other side of the coin, i.e. precarious work.   
116 Elements of the first two columns are adapted and elaborated from Stone, supra note [ ] at 114.  
Column three is the author’s contribution.  
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Security Of Job Of Employability 
(i.e. , gaining 
portable skills for 
future jobs)  
Little to None 
Remuneration Longevity-linked Market-based Piece rate / Pay as 
you go 
Career Benefits Lifetime Tenure Training Flexible scheduling 
Promises by 
Employer 
Opportunities for 
Promotion 
Forming Networks Be your own mini-
business; Freedom 
from wage labor; 
Work will come to 
you via your cell 
phone 
Due Process Collective 
Bargaining and 
Grievance 
Arbitration 
Dispute-Resolution 
Procedures for 
Individual Fairness 
Claims 
Little to None 
 
 
Interest in collective efforts such as prediction markets, 117 the use of spare 
computer cycles to search for intelligent life in the universe, and collective 
efforts like Wikipedia began to grow in the early 2000s. 118  The 
crowdwork model had its genesis in approximately 2005 with the spread 
of mobile computing and the emergence of prosumer websites where 
collective communities created goods that they would then purchase.119  
The “official” crowdwork platform for the Mechanical Turk was launched 
in 2007.   
There are fundamental differences between these models in the 
construction of the labor and its conditions.  While the industrial model 
had a modicum of stability and secure remuneration,  and arguably the 
digital model had some of these features as well, the crowdwork model is 
marked by rapid job fluctuation, decreasing authority of worker, a 
decrease in skill required and along with it decreasing remuneration.  The 
impact of precarity, especially within the context of information 
technology, is striking in crowdwork.  If the digital era broke schedules 
down into part-time or project-based shifts, crowdwork breaks those 
schedules down even further into the micro-level.  It moves from 
“project” based work (with coherent aims and stages) occurring over a 
                                         
117 See generally MICHAEL ABRAMOWITZ,  PREDICTOCRACY (2007); Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. 
Rogers, Prediction Markets and the First Amendment,  2008 U.  ILL.  L.  REV.  833 (2008).  
118 YOCHAI BENKLER,  THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 9 (2006). 
119 The portmanteau “prosumer” is comprised of the words producer and consumer.  It is a new business 
model that suggests that those that buy also have  role in the creation of the item they purchase.  Howe, supra 
note [ ], describes the growth of Threadless, a T-shirt company built on a prosumer model.  Community 
members would enter contests to design shirts, and the ones with the most votes were then produced and sold.   
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duration of weeks, months, or years, into “task” based work (the purpose 
of which may not ever be explained to workers) occurring in just hours, 
minutes, or seconds.  Micro labor is described as “taking the division of 
labor to once-unthinkable extremes.”120   
Furthermore, some of the advantages of the digital era are even 
weaker or non-existent in the “crowdsourcing” system.  No longer are 
there investments in employees for increased training, skills acquisition, or 
networking opportunities.  No longer is there any security of stable or 
predictable work, not to mention a living or even, in some as alleged in 
legal complaints,  a minimum wage.  Through automatic management, 
there is little employee discretion over tasks, and almost no 
communication with an actual supervisor who might train or coach the 
worker to improve.  Through automatic management, there are few 
requirements or systems of due process.  These are part of what 
sociologists have termed “bad jobs”:  no training, no advancement, low 
pay, and no job security.121   
Further, many forms of crowdwork require prior ownership of 
major equipment or property as a prerequisite for the job (a car to provide 
rides, an apartment to rent out, a private Intenet connection, as examples).  
In applying for a job, one may experience many immediate rejections.  A 
worker may have difficult odds in terms of facing a large number of 
similar workers with the same skillset.  The may also see many posts by 
perspective employers that only want skills that are specialized or rare.   
Rejection rates are high – the journalistic account of her crowdwork noted 
that her success rate in obtaining tasks was only one in six.122   
There is temporal chaos and pressure as well:  Tasks can be 
cancelled while a worker is in the midst of completion.  In those instances, 
the requester typically does not pay.  Rather, the worker must eat the cost.   
Other times, tasks can get double-booked, as they are filled automatically 
across websites that lack coordination.  Even if a worker receives a full 
day’s schedule of jobs, sometimes the commute between them, which is 
unpaid, subtracts from net wages.  Added to this is the competiveness and 
surveillance in the crowdwork model.  Workers have to achieve high 
ratings, which are posted on the website.  High ratings are not enough in 
isolation, rather their scores are ranked, ordered, and the workers are 
                                         
120 Glazer, NYT 2011 
121 Francois Carre, et al., Job Quality: Scenarios, Analysis and Interventions in ARE BAD JOBS 
INEVITABLE? TRENDS,  DETERMINANTS,  AND RESPONSES TO JOB QUALITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(EDS.  WARHURST,  ET AL.) 2 (2012).  
122 Sarah Kessler, Pixel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in the Gig Economy,  FAST COMPANY,  Mar. 18, 
2014, available at http://www.fastcompany.com/3027355/pixel-and-dimed-on-not-getting-by-in-the-gig-
economy. 
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expected to out-achieve each other.  Workers also spend significant time 
searching for jobs, finding and applying for each task, and do so quickly 
so as to beat out colleagues working for the same website.  As Kessler 
summarizes:  “I' m essentially competing for every hour of my 
employment.”123   
In many ways then, crowdsourcing is a return to industrial (or even 
pre-industrial in terms of its pay by the piece and work at home) systems.  
Crowdwork features highly rigid control systems and deskilled work.    
While some observers describe that platform sites are efficient in matching 
employers and workers, others point out that they drive down wages.  At 
the end of her run, Kessler earned on average $1.94 an hour on AMT (5 
cents for every 55 clicks in labeling images); and a total of $166 a week 
on TaskRabbit, which was slightly above the median rate for other 
workers in her neighborhood on this website. 124  Meanwhile, 
crowdworkers must rely on meager wages to make ends meet without 
traditional employee benefits such as sick days or health insurance.  
Ideally, technology should be a tool to assist workers, making 
work easier and safer while boosting productivity.  The logical outcome of 
technology would be less time spent on work, coupled with better and 
more satisfying jobs.  “Bad jobs” – those that are dirty, dangerous, and 
low-paying should increasingly be automated.  The work week should 
decrease and the gains from productivity should raise the average worker’s 
standard of living.   Unfortunately to date, that is not the story of 
crowdwork.  In fact the last few years have seen rising economic 
inequality, a bimodal distribution of good jobs and income, and bad jobs 
and low pay, with no reduction in the average work week.125 Although this 
is a complex phenomenon, it is safe to say that the productivity gains of 
technology are unevenly distributed.126  Stone’s intermediate digital model 
may have lacked job security, but at the least knowledge and 
“employability” played an important role in knowledge economy jobs.    
The crowdwork model may be more of a throwback to the 
industrial model, incorporating the efficiency and control of automatic 
management,  without the industrial model’s job security or stability.  But 
this result is not inevitable.  Technology should help us improve work 
systems and work design, not facilitate a race to the bottom of deskilling 
of work and lowered wages.  So the real question with crowdwork and the 
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126 See Carre, supra note [ ], at 5 (discussing potential scenarios including widening gap between good and 
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28 Miriam A. Cherry [18-Feb-16 
on-demand economy is not whether the workers fall into a particular 
doctrinal category of “employee” or “independent contractor,” as the 
current legal cases have structured the question.  Rather the question is 
whether the crowdwork model that the on-demand economy moves us into 
is a sustainable and desirable future of work.   
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
 In this article, I hope to have first given the reader a timely update 
regarding labor litigation in the on-demand economy litigation.  Currently 
these lawsuits mainly focus on the gateway question:  Are the gig 
economy workers “employees”?  As of this writing, no clear consensus 
seems to have emerged, and the tests that would be applied historically are 
malleable.  The litigation chart that was herein produced shows that the 
issues have a similar and remarkable homogeneity even when looking at 
forms of work as diverse as home repair, driving, and grocery delivery.  
 The second part of the paper sought to take a step back and analyze 
the major issues that are lurking behind the cases and the doctrinal labels.  
Crowdwork represents a new phase in the digital transformation of work.  
Situated as it is in the cross-current of precarious work, automatic 
management, and deskilling, the way crowdwork is currently formulated 
presents a bleak and disturbing picture.  But by recognizing the factors 
that lead these to be considered “bad jobs,” perhaps we can then begin the 
work that needs to be done to avoid this outcome.     
 
